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Introduction
A major part of politics is the conveying of ideas. This is the function of
political communication. Of the multitude of ways this conveying can take place,
deliberation in a public sphere is one that Habermas (1994) termed optimal.
Both public spheres and deliberative democracy presuppose an equality of all
participants in a debate and the superiority of good arguments. Presently, both
features are not evident.
Large debates with many participants require a mediator to relay messages from
one participant to the next. To some extent, mass media tries to fulfill that role.
However, the use of mass media as mediator comes at a cost: under the impression
of the sheer volume of messages to deliver, mass media needs to prioritize and
select messages (Strömbäck 2008). This selection heuristic, however, is far from
Habermas’ ideal: not all participants are equal and arguments not always rule
(Meyer and Hinchman 2002).
In contrast to mass media, social media—by definition—implements equality
of all users from the start and also places the selection of messages under their
control. It therefore has the potential to deliver on both: fulfilling a role as
a public sphere and promoting the qualities of deliberative debate. In this
contribution I establish a baseline of social media’s role as a public sphere, using
recent Twitter data.
This paper is organized as follows. I will first review the literature pertaining to
public spheres and their interaction with media, mass or otherwise. I will then
turn to describe the used data set and the employed analytical methods. The
next section will present the results of my analysis. Thereafter I will discuss
these results in light of the theory reviewed above and close with some concluding
remarks.
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Public Spheres & Media
The original function of political communication was to facilitate the finding
of agreeable positions. Informed citizens were to exchange and discuss ideas
in order to discover these ideas’ applicability to reality. As societies quickly—
quite literally—outgrew the practicality of round tables and forum discussions,
something Habermas termed the public sphere (Habermas 1991; Habermas 2006)
took over.1
The concept of a public sphere is embedded in the wider framework of deliberative
democracy. If the public sphere is the location where political debates take place,
deliberative democracy describes the mode of these debates (Habermas 1994).
Cohen (2003) extends Habermas when identifying the common good as the aim
of all deliberation in deliberative democracy. His formal definition entails five
points: independence of association, self-referencing, equality of ideas, rooted in
reality, and reciprocal respect.
In his in-depth study of traces of deliberative democracy on the Internet, Dahlberg
(2001) uses a similar list but adds a sixth point to it: reflexivity, that is the
requirement to question one’s own standpoints.
From this list it becomes clear, that deliberative democracy not only describes a
practice, but a form of institution. Obviously, it is not a role that a medium can
fulfill. Even Dahlberg (2001) had to concede, that the technology of that time
simply was not up to providing for institutionalized deliberative democracy on
the Internet. However, it is still possible to carve out the term of deliberative
practices: exchanging ideas and objective, reasonable, Dahlberg (2001) calls
them rational–critical, arguments in their support.
Thinking deliberative practices in concert with a public sphere makes the sensible,
fact-based argument its communicative hallmark feature. In his introduction
to a collection of essays on deliberative democracy, Elster (1998) distills a
common ground of contemporary definitions of the deliberative practices part of
deliberative democracy:
“decision making by means of arguments offered by and to partici-
pants who are committed to the values of rationality and impartiality”
(p. 8, emphasis in the original).
It is this definition of deliberative practices that I will use here. Deliberative
practices serve to instill life into the hollowness of a public sphere by describing
the mode of communication that is conducive to the functioning of a public
sphere. This requires reasonable arguments. As we shall see in the next section,
they are to be found in specific kinds of news stories. News stories, that are not
always of the prevailing kind.
1Common features of public spheres identified in the literature are a mutual mode of
communication and equally reciprocal acceptance of each other as legitimate participants
(Koopmans and Erbe 2004; Risse and Steeg 2003).
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Media
In the modern public sphere, or spheres (Dahlgren 2005), it is still citizens
directly exchanging ideas and engaging in political debate. However, Habermas’
conception was an idealized one from the beginning. Neither did citizens have
the interest nor the talent or time to be constantly engaged in debates. Rather,
a mediator and a caste of professional citizens emerged, the former distilling
political messages of the latter into a format that allowed even part-time citizens
to—at least on some level—partake in the debate. While this extends the
accessibility of the public sphere’s debates to a larger crowd, there is also another
side to that bargain: the mediator might transform the messages sent by other
participants in a debate. And once there are more messages fed into the mediator
than can reasonably be processed and relayed to others, the mediator will start
selecting messages according to its own rules. And this is, where trouble starts.
Schulz (2004) and Strömbäck (2008) summarize these troubles under the term of
mediatization. Here, mass media acts as the mediator and in that role tampers
with the political system in a number of ways. Foremost, it selects messages to
relay to others by its own media logic: newspaper circulation figures and TV
ratings, for example. Mass media uses these numbers to gauge the profitability
of any message. Will any given message contribute to these figures and therefore
increase the medium’s income, or not? Based on the answer to that question, a
message will be relayed, or not.
To further increase the value of a message, mass media will restyle the message and
potentially cripple its original meaning. This media logic becomes internalized
by politicians seeking to maximize their mass media presence. This leads to
the interesting phenomenon of shifting political communication’s attention from
conveying ideas to reformulating ideas to concur with this specific media logic.
The regime of mediatization is not necessarily detrimental to the functioning
of a democracy or even the bare exchange of ideas. As long as the media logic
captures the idea correctly and does not penalize the complexity of ideas nor
favor simplistic solutions, mediatization has the potential of actually enriching
public sphere debates. For example, consider data journalism or fact-checking
politicians’ claims. Both methods comply with a media logic that favors truth
over simplicity, therefore enticing politicians to communicate ideas truthfully
and as complex as necessary.
On the other hand, the vast majority of mass media follows a different logic: here,
shortness, entertainment and drama are elements that are of greater importance
than an idea’s foundation in facts or civic vision (Iyengar and Simon 2000;
Iyengar, Luskin, and Fishkin 2004; Iyengar and Kinder 2010; Strömbäck 2008).
This media logic leads politicians to offer populist solutions—quick and dirty,
sellable to a broad audience with short attention spans (Strömbäck and Esser
2009; Meyer and Hinchman 2002; Hjarvard 2008; Strömbäck 2008). This media
logic cannot aptly capture ideas anymore, and therefore leads to an erosion of
the public sphere.
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Iyengar and Kinder (2010) argue that due to the advent of cable TV in the
1990s, mass media is subjected to an heightened state of competition. While
up to the 1980s, only three networks supplied largely identical news to a large
audience, the exponential growth of media outlets enabled citizens to opt-out
of news. Or, if they still actively listen to news, they can now choose which
news they subscribe to. This leads to media outlets producing news that is
targeted specifically at their (remaining) share of customers: highly partisan
and appealing to them.
In a political context, what exactly is appealing to consumers of news? Iyengar,
Norpoth, and Hahn (2004) answer this question clearly with “horse race’‘or
episodic news, that is news that cover the current state of the campaign, and not
thematic content on the candidates’ positions. They understand episodicity and
thematicity as opposing concepts: the more episodic a piece of news is, the less
thematic it can be. While their contribution has numerous methodological flaws,
they convincingly put forth their argument of a decline of thematic content due
to competitive pressure among media outlets. This argument is also in line with
theory (Traugott and Lavrakas 2008), that would predict these market effects to
occur along with intrinsic journalistic self-selection.
Considering the thematic–episodic content rift in terms of deliberative practices
allows for additional insights. If mass media function as a mediator in Haber-
masian public spheres, then their debate contributions should be based on reason
and impartiality. Iyengar, Norpoth, and Hahn (2004) give a textbook example
for both kinds of contributions: a story about a homeless woman and her plight;
a story intended to serve as a proxy for the fates of countless others. Touching
as the story might be, it is void of reason and does not serve to contribute to
a rational debate based on facts and impartial arguments. This episodic news
story is contrasted by a thematic one: thorough research of facts, causes and
consequences of homelessness; founded in reason and instructive in any search for
solutions, abstracting away individual stories for the sake of the bigger picture.
As noted above, competition among media outlets has grown to tremendous
proportions. Since all competitors in the mass media game are commercial
enterprises and therefore immanently seeking to maximize their profit, the
dominant factor for selecting news is its market value. However, this value does
not refer to the amount a customer is willing to pay for any particular piece of
news. Rather, this figure correlates directly with circulation figures or ratings as
they govern the ad premiums a media outlet can charge.
A factor that is not to be underestimated is the vicious circle this mass media
mediatization can lead to. Politicians vying for media presence become then
tempted to style their own messages in a media compatible way. An example
might be the Team Stronach’s campaign for the 2013 general election in Austria;
more specifically its reaction to a high-profile international custody battle over
a child. There, an industrial magnate offered his private jet to the Austrian
mother to facilitate her legal struggle in Denmark. This episodic news story
worked very well and secured nationwide (tabloid) headlines for his party and
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the generous offer. However, any political ideas on how international custody
disputes should be resolved in the future, any abstract argument, was either not
sent by Stronach’s spokespersons or not relayed by mass media. Therefore, the
entire message did not contribute to any deliberative practice.
In summary, there are several clues that point towards mass media communication
not always being true to its envisioned role in public spheres and deliberative
debates. The pressure from competition leads to mass media selecting and
transforming news to adhere to a style that maximizes its market value (Blumler
and Kavanagh 1999).
Social media is potentially different. There, users seek to maximize their own
value by providing content their respective audiences find useful (Raymond 1999;
Rheingold 1993; Pettersson and Karlström 2011). Therefore, users would be
expected to propagate content they themselves believe their followers will find
interesting. In an arena free from traditional market pressures, this could lead
to users selecting thematic over episodic content.
Data & Method
In order to test the hypothesis put forth above, the last 3200 (the maximum the
Twitter API would allow) tweets emanating from the Republican and Demo-
cratic party accounts, respectively, were harvested on May 25th, 2014. As not
both parties generate tweets at the same rate, coverage is provided starting
from 2013-02-13 for Democrats and 2013-07-31 for Republicans. Apparently,
Democrats use their account much more sparingly than Republicans. Given that
@BarrackObama can also be attributed to Democratic party control, this is of
little surprise.
In general, Democrats enjoy more popularity on Twitter than Democrats. This
leads to Democrat’s tweets being more often retweeted than their Republican
counterparts. On average, Democratic tweets were retweeted 60 times, while
Republican ones only score half as many retweets on average: 28. Since the
range of retweets in enormous, with the most popular tweet in the data set
being retweeted 24,352 times2, the top 1 percent of retweeted tweets were
considered singular and therefore excluded from all analysis3. Figure 1 describes
the development of tweet popularity over time.
Of the 6,336 tweets that remained in the data set, 3,592 pointed to resolvable
websites. Those were harvested as well. The texts on those websites were
extracted, cleaned, normalized and fed into an LDA topic model algorithm. The
number of topics, 10, was empirically established. Figure 2 gives an overview of
topic distribution among tweets.
2This tweet was a retweet itself of a message that Wendy Davis of Texas initially posted
thanking Texans for support in stopping controversial Senate Bill 5 on abortions.
3The top 1 percent of tweets range from 534 to above 24,000 retweets. 64 tweets fell into
that range and were excluded.
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Figure 1: Development of retweets over time for both parties with GAM-based
trend line and elections to House or Senate indicated by dotted verticals.
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Figure 2: Heatmap depicting the distribution of topics across all tweets for both
parties. The darker the spike, the stronger the topic occurs in the tweet.
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The extracted topics were classified according to their aspect as either episodic
or thematic. A third “aspect” was necessitated by websites that contained
unparsable content, like pictures or content hidden by AJAX techniques. These
topics were then not considered any further. Tables 1 and 2 give an overview
over the extracted topics and their rating as thematic or episodic.
Topic Content Aspect
1 candidate, announcement episodic
2 health insurance thematic
3 republican party politics episodic
4 (unparsable) NA
5 democratic call to action episodic
6 democratic call for donations episodic
7 (unparsable) NA
8 church and state separation thematic
9 democratic party politics episodic
10 (unparseable) NA
Table 1: Topics on websites tweeted by Democrats.
Number Content Aspect
1 republican call to action episodic
2 national unemployment thematic
3 candidate, announcement episodic
4 obama care is unpopular thematic
5 republican call to action episodic
6 obama care is expensive thematic
7 republican call for donations episodic
8 (unparsable) NA
9 arguments against obamacare thematic
10 republican call for support episodic
Table 2: Topics on websites tweeted by Republicans.
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As LDA provides posterior probabilities of belonging to each topic for each
website (M), as depicted in Figure 2, thematicity and episodicity scores were
computed for each tweet linking to a website. This episodicity (thematicity)
score was obtained by summing up those elements mik of M where k is an
element of the set of all episodic (thematic) topics K:
ei =
∑
k∈K mik
Therefore, episodicity (thematicity) scores range from 0 to 1 with 0 being a
website without any episodic (thematic) topics and 1 a website containing solely
episodic (thematic) topics. The development of episodicity and thematicity over
time for both parties is given in Figure 3. It becomes evident that party strategies
with respect to the prevalence of are not only divergent but also changing over
time.
Starting from these descriptive observations, I will now present a model linking
episodicity and thematicity with the reshare count.
Results
In order to establish any association between episodicity, thematicity and the
reshare count of a message, a generalized linear model is considered. Based
the findings in Hochreiter and Waldhauser (2013), the model contains control
variables for time of day and message length. An additional control variable
relating to the distance from a tweet’s posting to the closest election is also
included in the model.4 As count-based models require constant observational
frames, an offset term computed from the number of followers for the respective
party account (np) times the age of the message (a) was included as well:
o = np × a
The initial model contained the first order terms for party membership, episodic-
ity, thematicity, time of day, message length and the election proximity. All these
terms were complemented with interactions with the party variable. Finally,
thematicity and episodicity interactions with party were included as well.
Starting with this complete model, insignificant interactions were removed, one
at a time. This led to the removal of the party—message length and party—
thematicity interactions. Table 3 contains the test results from the model
selection step.
4In order to stabilize the variance in that distance, the square root of the term was
considered.
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Figure 3: The development of the prevalence of episodic and thematic content
over time for both parties. Trend lines are GAM-based and elections to House
or Senate are indicated by dotted verticals.
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2 x log-lik. Test df LR stat. Pr(χ2)
-33964 1 vs 2 1 1.95 0.1626
-33963 2 vs 3 1 0.8676 0.3516
Table 3: Likelihood ratio tests confirming dropping of party—
message length and party—thematicity interactions from the model.
Owing to the count nature of the dependent variable, Poisson regression or
a negative-binomial model must be used. Based on a likelihood-ratio test
comparing the Poisson and negative binomial versions of the model, χ2(14, N =
3592) = 138, 045.92, p = 0, equality of conditional mean and variance cannot be
assumed and a negative binomial model is therefore more appropriate.
The final model’s estimates, standard errors and p-values are given in Table 4.
βi SE p-value
(Intercept) -14.45 0.139 0
Party (1=R) -0.142 0.095 0.136
Episodicity -1.132 0.125 0
Thematicity -0.73 0.134 0
Retweet (1=Yes) 1.526 0.164 0
Time of Day 0.039 0.009 0
Message Length 0.003 0.001 0
√
Proxi. 0.229 0.02 0
Episodicity (Rep) 0.241 0.089 0.007
Retweet (Rep) -1.104 0.218 0
Time of Day (Rep) -0.029 0.012 0.017
Episodicity
×√Proxi.
-0.079 0.024 0.001
Thematicity
×√Proxi.
-0.11 0.026 0
Table 4: Final model coefficients.
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Discussion
Akin to the more familiar odds ratios from logistic regression, count data sports
incidence rate ratios as interpretation of its exponentiated coefficients. These
IRRs can be found in Table 5.
expβi
(Intercept) 0
Party (1=R) 0.867
Episodicity 0.322
Thematicity 0.482
Retweet (1=Yes) 4.599
Time of Day 1.04
Message Length 1.003
√
Proxi. 1.257
Episodicity (Rep) 1.272
Retweet (Rep) 0.332
Time of Day (Rep) 0.972
Episodicity ×√Proxi. 0.924
Thematicity
×√Proxi.
0.896
Table 5: Incidence rate ratios for the model coefficients reflecting
the expected change in retweet rates for one unit increases.
From these results, I am going to discuss the more remarkable ones here.
1. There is a quite strong difference between reshares Republican and
Democrats can expect, even when controlling for different user base sizes:
for a tweet that would have generated 100 reshares if it had originated
with the Democrats, the Republicans can only expect 87.
Obviously, Democrats lead social media usage not only by the number of
followers but also by their (the followers’) dedication to the medium.
2. Episodic and thematic content enjoy virtually the same popularity. It is
also evident, that the less thematic or episodic a message is, the higher
the expected reshare count. While surprising at first, this is an artifact
introduced by unparsable content on the websites. It is entirely conceivable
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that images – for their simplicity and easy to understand punchlines – are
more popular all together than textual content.
When comparing textual content directly, it becomes evident that thematic
content is almost 150 percent as popular as episodic content. Interestingly,
this difference is only to be found in Democratic tweets and all but disap-
pears for tweets sent from the Republican account. These differences are
contrary to the predictions of Iyengar, Norpoth, and Hahn (2004). There,
consumers would want episodic, horserace news. In this data set, however,
users in general don’t like textual content. Among textual content they do
prefer thematic over episodic news.
3. Finally, there are interesting effects dependent on the proximity of a
message to election day. In general, the expected reshare count increases
by 25 percent for every additional square root day away from an election.
This effect is toned done somewhat for episodic or thematic content.
Conclusion
In this paper I have been looking at the way both US political parties make use
of social media. The example case for this study was Twitter and I analyzed
the last 3,200 tweets that originated from the main party accounts along with
any websites they might point to. I’ve concentrated on tracing how thematic
and episodic content is being distributed (differently) via Twitter. To that end,
I’ve text-mined any websites that were mentioned in those tweets and used
LDA topic models to extract the topics that occur in these websites. Using
Iyengar’s definition of episodic or horserace news, I classified all (parsable) topics
to be either episodic or thematic. Finally, generalized linear models are used to
model the relationship between the retweets a message receives and episodicity,
thematicity and some controlling covariates.
The results in parts contradict what theory would have predicted, in that thematic
news is more popular than episodic one. Iyengar, Norpoth, and Hahn (2004)
argue that mass media focuses on episodic news, because that is what consumers
demand. I, therefore, tentatively conclude that social media would have a
potential as a public sphere, supporting arguments in political deliberation.
While these results are only preliminary and from a very limited data set, they are
informative in the sense that they lead us to question the long-held assumption
that market forces lead to episodic news coverage. Clearly, more in-depth and
broader analysis is needed to grow confidence in this challenge.
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